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Imagine an every-day grocery shopper entering a store. This con-
sumer cares about where products come from and about what goes into a 
product. For example, this consumer wants to avoid genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) because of health concerns and environmental impact. 
Walking through the aisles to pick basic products such as cereal, canned 
corn or beans, this consumer takes a quick look at the label to find the 
information he or she needs. The only information available on the labels 
is a Quick Response Code (QR code),1 for which the consumer needs a 
smartphone. There are many reasons why this consumer might give up on 
using the QR code: being in a hurry, not being able to afford a smartphone, 
poor cell service, or lack of technological knowledge. The results are the 
same: use of the QR code to designate the presence of GMOs effectively 
deprives the consumer of the right to choose GMO-free food. This unap-
pealing result is essentially the consequence of the new federal GMO la-
beling law. Investors experience similar difficulties when trying to identify 
opportunities with companies that claim to have adopted sustainable prac-
tices. The lack of enforcement of climate risk disclosures from the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and attacks from big industry lobbies on 
other types of disclosure requirements deprive consumers and investors of 
the power to encourage sustainable practices.  
The concept of sustainability has become increasingly important over 
the last couple of decades. Governments around the world struggle to en-
                                                 
1 QR codes are high capacity encodings of data that can be printed out in small sizes on packages 
and labels that users can scan with the use of a smart phone to access a Web page containing more 
information about the product. See QRCode.com, What is a QR Code?, https://perma.cc/R4DD-
EGRB.  
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hance economic growth while minimizing the negative impacts on the en-
vironment and providing humane working conditions for a growing pop-
ulation.2 Defining the term “sustainability” itself has proven difficult, cen-
tering on the idea of promoting economic development in a way that will 
benefit present and future generations without detrimentally affecting the 
resources of the planet.3 Sustainability law presents political and legal 
challenges that environmentalists have not yet been able to solve effi-
ciently.4 An increasing number of scholars have recognized that the tradi-
tional “command and control” environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s 
and 1980s have failed to adapt to the 21st century.5 In order to provide 
efficient protection to our environment, we must shift our focus toward a 
policy based on sound science, careful cost-benefit analysis and risk as-
sessment, and greater transparency.6 Consumers and investors play a cen-
tral role in this sustainability-based framework by choosing products and 
investment opportunities that promote sustainable practices. In turn, this 
will encourage businesses to enter the market to supply such products, po-
tentially bringing down their cost. However, consumers and investors cur-
rently lack the crucial information they need to be able to make informed 
choices regarding sustainability, such as: the raw materials going into a 
product, the labor practices of the producer, or the carbon intensity of the 
product.  
Recent developments regarding disclosure requirements imposed on 
companies seem to reflect the will to provide consumers and investors with 
more information regarding the products they purchase. However, these 
                                                 
2 See David R. Boyd, Sustainability Law, Respecting the Laws of Nature, MCGILL INT’L REV. 
57 (2005) (depicting a pessimistic image of human activity’s impact on our planet, arguing that the 
Earth’s ozone layer was badly damaged in the past century, that forests, grasslands, coral reefs and 
other ecosystems have been destroyed or damaged, and that the majority of the world’s fisheries are 
in decline). 
3 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) declares that “[s]ustainability is based on a 
simple principle: Everything that we need for our survival and well-being depends, either directly or 
indirectly, on our natural environment. To pursue sustainability is to create and maintain the conditions 
under which humans and nature can exist in productive harmony to support present and future gener-
ations.” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Lean About Sustainability,  https://perma.cc/J29M-
NXZN . Oregon defines “sustainability “as “using, developing and protecting resources in a manner 
that enables people to meet current needs and provides that future generations can also meet future 
needs, from the joint perspective of environmental, economic and community objectives.” OR. REV. 
STAT.§184.421 (2015). 
4 See generally John C. Dernbach & Joel A. Mintz, Environmental Laws and Sustainability: An 
Introduction, 3 SUSTAINABILITY 531 (2011). 
5 Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 117–
20 (2004). 
6 Daniel C. Esty and Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Sustainability and Competitiveness: Pol-
icy Imperative and Corporate Opportunity 1, (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper).  
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developments have proven largely ineffective.7 One of these develop-
ments, the 2016 GMO labeling law, reflects a bi-partisan compromise, but 
has encountered mixed feelings from consumers. 8 In addition, the SEC 
issued guidelines indicating how public companies should report climate 
risks in yearly reports; however, this requirement has remained largely un-
enforced since the first two years after its promulgation, and has little in-
fluence today.9 A third attempt to compel disclosure of “non-sustainable” 
practices came with the Dodd-Frank Act’s10 provisions addressing conflict 
minerals-which require all companies to report the use of conflict minerals 
in their supply chain.11 These mandated disclosures are all part of a broader 
effort to develop sustainability law by adopting a similar scheme: empow-
ering consumers and investors to have a positive impact on decision-mak-
ing with regard to sustainability issues.  
Although the GMO law, the SEC-mandated climate risk disclosures, 
and regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act take an important first step to-
ward developing a sustainable economy, all of these legislations implicate 
First Amendment issues in one way or another. Opponents of these devel-
opments, often lobbyists and industries, argue that compelling companies 
to disclose factually true information related to products and corporate 
practices constitutes a violation of the Constitution. Specifically, they ar-
gue that such requirements intrude upon freedom of speech, a fundamental 
right that has always been championed in the United States. These exam-
ples do not implicate traditional freedom of speech issues; rather, these 
laws fall into the specific category of compelled commercial free speech, 
according them a different level of constitutional protection under Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 12  
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding compelled commercial 
speech makes it difficult to legislate in this area, as the Court applies dif-
ferent tests for different categories of regulations affecting commercial 
speech. Following Central Hudson, the courts have generally subjected 
regulations on commercial speech to a level of heightened scrutiny, but, in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,13 the Supreme Court applied 
                                                 
7 See infra § II(C).  
8 See Andrea Hayley, Organic Industry at Odds Over National GMO Labeling Bill, EPOCH 
TIMES (July 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/PA63-YZ92. Despite the criticism, the new law still marks a 
step towards the right direction. See Mark Bittman, G.M.O. Labeling Law Could Stir a Revolution, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2016, at A19.  
9 See David Gelles, When Investors Aren’t Told About Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2016, at BU7.   
10 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
11 Id. at §§1502-1504; Conflict Minerals, 77 FR 56273 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
12 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See infra §III. 
13 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
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a lower “rational basis” scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of a 
government regulation compelling commercial speech when the govern-
mental interest at stake was “preventing deception of consumers.”14 How-
ever, recent jurisprudential developments have blurred this distinction, 
leaving uncertainty as to what standard must be met by regulations com-
pelling disclosure.15  
This article aims at providing a guide towards rehabilitation of com-
pelled disclosure legislation by arguing that the Supreme Court should ad-
dress and resolve the confusion around the scope of Zauderer by adopting 
a rational basis test for compelled commercial speech regulations.16 The 
current state of compelled speech jurisprudence limits the government’s 
ability to promote sustainability, thus preventing consumers from access-
ing information necessary to make more sustainable choices. This status 
quo essentially allows industry lobbies to conceal valuable information 
from the public. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reassess the Zau-
derer test to send the important message that companies will not be al-
lowed to use the First Amendment as a shield against consumers and in-
vestors’ requests for more transparency. By adopting a clear standard gov-
erning compelled commercial speech, the Supreme Court could indirectly 
empower consumers and investors to choose a more sustainable future. 
Additional information would allow consumers and investors to choose 
products based on their impact on the environment, local communities, 
and other sustainability-related data. 
This article analyzes the legal difficulties in trying to better inform 
consumers and investors, particularly as applied against freedom of speech 
in the commercial setting. Part II analyzes recent legal developments 
                                                 
14 Id. at 651. Under the rational basis standard, a regulation compelling commercial speech will 
not run afoul of the First Amendment if there is a rational connection between the warnings’ legitimate 
purpose and means used to achieve that purpose. Id. However, the Supreme Court has only applied 
Zauderer in one other case also involving misleading advertising. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 
P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
15 For example, The D.C. Circuit, in a 2014 decision reviewing a government regulation forcing 
companies to list on the labels of their meat cuts the country of origin of the animal, held that “Zau-
derer in fact does reach beyond problems of deception, sufficiently to encompass the disclosure at 
issue here.” Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter 
AMI]. The AMI decision turned out to be particularly important in the context of disclosure require-
ments addressed in this article, as the decision also overruled the first holding of the D.C. Circuit 
striking down the provisions of the Conflict Minerals rule under the Central Hudson test. Nat’l Ass’n 
of Mfgs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter NAM I]. On rehearing, the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed its initial decision on a different basis. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfgs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) [hereinafter NAM II]. Still, these three D.C. Circuit opinions do highlight the confusion 
surrounding the reach of the Zauderer decision. 
16 It is of note that at least one other scholar has argued that regulations that compel commercial 
speech should have to clear the same constitutional test as restrictions on commercial speech. See 
Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ L. 
REV. 421 (2016); But see infra §V(A). 
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aimed at informing consumers and investors, describing the controversies 
surrounding the SEC climate risks disclosures, the Dodd-Frank Act’s con-
flict minerals provisions, and GMO labeling requirements. Part III pro-
vides a summary of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with regard to 
commercial speech and compelled speech, and also addresses the latest 
cases scrutinizing mandated disclosures. Part IV explains why disclosure 
requirements are integral in empowering investors and consumers to 
choose a sustainable future. Part V analyzes and rejects the argument that 
the mandated disclosures discussed here violate free speech protections. 
Part VI then argues that the Supreme Court should address and clarify the 
test applied to compelled commercial speech by adopting a more permis-
sive test for the government. The article concludes that labeling require-
ments and mandated climate risks disclosures are not only consistent with 
the Constitution; but are also fundamentally important as tools to educate 
consumers and investors about the impact of their choices on the develop-
ment of a sustainable economy.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
For consumers and investors to make further strides towards a more 
sustainable economy, they need information enabling them to choose be-
tween products which were manufactured using environmentally-con-
scious processes that accounted for environmental or human harm as op-
posed to products manufactured with little concern for such impacts. Re-
cent legal developments have tried to remedy the lack of information for 
consumers and investors in different sectors of our economy. The SEC-
mandated climate risk disclosures, the Dodd-Frank Act conflict minerals 
disclosures, and most recently, the emergence of GMO labeling laws are 
all evidence of the effort to provide consumers with more information. 
This section analyzes these recent developments to highlight their 
strengths and flaws.   
A. SEC Climate Risk Disclosures 
In 2010, the SEC issued guidelines encouraging companies to report 
serious climate risks that could potentially harm their profits.17 This infor-
mation, along with other substantial events relating to business activities 
such as lawsuits, financial performance, and business trends, is compiled 
in annual reports known as 10-Ks, which are available to investors. Many 
                                                 
17 See Benjamin Hulac, Inside the Mirage of Good Climate Info at the SEC, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug. 
11, 2016), https://perma.cc/597C-FNHF. Then-SEC chairwoman Mary Schapiro warned that “[w]e 
are not opining on whether the world’s climate is changing, at what pace it might be changing, or due 
to what causes.” Id. The guidelines basically served as a reminder the companies have an obligation 
to disclose all “material” information to investors. 
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investors, convinced that climate effects, such as rising sea levels and ex-
treme weather, harmed their financial returns, originally welcomed the 
new guidelines. In the past, the SEC enforced these guidelines, asking 
companies to explain in greater detail how climate change-related issues 
affected their business.18  However, these practices were short-lived and 
eventually stopped under the current chairwoman.19  
The agency has since faced growing criticism for its lack of enforce-
ment of climate risk disclosures.20 Studies of U.S. public companies listed 
on major stock exchanges showed that only 27 percent of about 4,000 total 
companies even mentioned the words “climate change” or “global warm-
ing” in their filings.21 The fact that so many companies failed to mention 
these terms shows a deficiency with regard to the SEC’s enforcement 
power, which stems from the voluntary nature of the disclosures.22 How-
ever, mandatory climate risk disclosure would surely draw strong opposi-
tion from industry lobbies. These lobbyists generally argue that requiring 
disclosure of facts that companies would not otherwise elect to disclose is 
“compelled speech,” and thus a violation of the First amendment.23 Even 
in their current state, the voluntary disclosures are facing attacks from a 
majority Republican Congress.24 Congressman Bill Posey introduced leg-
islation to block SEC reporting guidance on climate change risks for pub-
licly traded companies, as he also did in 2010 and 2012,25 arguing that the 
uncertainty of the science of climate change defeated the need for such a 
guidance.26 Opponents of the guidance also argue that the number of cli-
mate risk disclosures have failed to improve since the guidance was en-
acted in 2010 and that the quality of disclosure was poor.27 However, the 
flaws of the guidance seem to come from the fact that the SEC has no real 
                                                 
18 See id. 
19 Id. 
20 See David Gelles, S.E.C. Is Criticized for Lax Enforcement of Climate Risk Disclosure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2016, at BU7; Robert Repetto, It’s Time the SEC Enforced its Climate Disclosure 
Rules, IISD, (Mar. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/LA2H-5XUC . 
21 Zahra Hirji, Most U.S. Companies Ignoring SEC Rule to Disclose Climate Risks, INSIDE 
CLIMATE NEWS, Sept. 19, 2013, https://perma.cc/9BKG-F22T. 
22 Gelles, supra note 20. 
23 When the Conflict Minerals Rule was held unconstitutional, some scholars expressed concern 
that few disclosure requirements would survive First Amendment scrutiny and that companies’ free 
speech would always trump disclosure obligations. Dynda A. Thomas, SEC Conflict Minerals Rule 
Legal Challenge is Over – But Not For Good, CONFLICT MINERALS LAW (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/KT8T-DT5W. 
24 Mindy Lubber, SEC Climate Risk Disclosure Effort Under Serious Attack from Congress, 
FORBES (July 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/FNQ6-Y8ME. 
25 Id. 
26 Hiroko Tabuchi, Clifford Kraus, A New Debate Over Pricing the Risks of Climate Change, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2016, at B1.  
27 See GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SEC CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE 
GUIDANCE: AN OVERVIEW AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS 4-5 (2013). 
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enforcement tools, rather than because of the uncertainty of climate 
change.  
While the SEC’s climate risk disclosures are far from perfect in their 
current state, they could become an important tool to provide investors 
with the information necessary to make sustainable choices. The SEC re-
ceived strong support for more detailed and stricter disclosure require-
ments, with dozens of institutional investors submitting letters to the fed-
eral agency in 2016.28 The letters requested quick action to “require 
stronger reporting of sustainability risks such as climate change, water 
scarcity and global forestation.”29 The SEC should act toward this goal in 
order to fulfill its mission of ensuring that publicly traded companies pro-
vide investors with the necessary information material to make meaningful 
choices.30 Such information is not easily available, and it is the SEC’s re-
sponsibility to facilitate investors’ access to it.  
B. Conflict Minerals Disclosure  
The SEC was also at the center of a controversial sustainability-re-
lated provision when it enacted the final rule implementing Section 1502 
of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act requires companies using gold, tin, tung-
sten, and tantalum to determine whether the minerals came from the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or adjoining countries similarly plagued 
by conflicts.31 If so, companies must carry out a “due diligence” review of 
their supply chain to assess whether they are funding armed groups by 
purchasing these minerals.32 The SEC issued the final rule implementing 
Section 1502 in August 2012, requiring companies to report publicly on 
their due diligence starting in 2013, and mandating independent audits on 
the reports.33  
Compared to the SEC climate risk disclosures, the Conflict Minerals 
rule created a stronger enforcement mechanism. The rule calls for civil 
                                                 
28 Peyton Fleming, In Unprecedented Response, Investors Call On SEC To Improve Reporting 
Of Climate Risks And Other Sustainability Challenges, CERES (July 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/P94S-
KVYG.  
29 Id.  
30 Lubber, supra note 24. 
31 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1502 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. Ch 2B) (2010).  
32Implementation of US Dodd-Frank Act Rule on Conflict Minerals: Commentaries, Guidance, 
Company Actions, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, https://perma.cc/AVA2-RTG4. 
Due diligence measures must conform to a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence 
framework, for example as approved by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD). See Fact Sheet, Disclosing the use of Conflict Minerals, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/N55Q-DV52. 
33Conflict Minerals, 77 FR 56273 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
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penalties for companies knowingly making a false or misleading state-
ment. Companies also face pressure from human rights activists, nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), and consumers to show that minerals 
used in the supply chain are conflict-free.34 The rule rapidly came under 
attack in the D.C. Circuit,35 and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
recently affirmed a lower court judgment holding that the Conflict Miner-
als Rule was unconstitutional.36 Specifically, the Court held that the re-
quirement to report minerals as having “not been found to be DRC conflict 
Free”37 violated the First Amendment by compelling companies to dis-
close information they would not otherwise elect to disclose. Although the 
Court accepted the premise that alleviating the conflict in Congo was a 
sufficient governmental interest to pass the Central Hudson test, the Court 
held that the rule’s effects on the conflict were too speculative and could 
instead have “a significant adverse effect on innocent bystanders in the 
DRC.”38 At this time, the future of the Conflict Minerals rule is uncertain, 
and the SEC may have to rewrite some or all of the rule, consistent with 
the First Amendment.39  
Uncertainty around regulations such as the Conflict Minerals Rule, 
which aims at promoting social and environmental responsibility in the 
corporate world, is only growing as President Trump’s administration set-
tles into office.40 The new administration has already vowed to repeal or 
replace parts of the Dodd-Frank Act.41 Whether President Trump will keep 
his campaign promises — and if so, to what extent — should be worth 
following. 
C. The Long-Disputed GMO Labeling Law 
Organic farmers and environmental groups in the United States have 
pushed for a mandatory GMO labeling law for years,42 but the resulting 
                                                 
34 Lynnley Browning, Companies Struggle to Comply With Rules on Conflict Minerals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015, at B1. 
35 See NAM I, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
36 See NAM II, 800 F.3d 518, 520–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 526.  
39 As for now, companies should still investigate and review their activities, as the European 
Union is developing its own conflict minerals regulation, and the SEC rule is still valid at the moment. 
See Thomas, supra note 23. 
40 See Lam Bourree, Trump’s Promises to Corporate Leaders: Lower Taxes and Fewer Regula-
tions, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/J7YT-AYNN (quoting Mr. Trump telling cor-
porate leaders he “think[s] we can cut regulation by 75 percent, maybe more”). 
41 Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Reg-
ulations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2017, at A4. 
42 See Chelsea Harvey, People want GMO food labeled – which is pretty much all they know 
about GMOs, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 21, 2016) http://perma.cc/L2TS-9QKX. 
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legislation left these activists largely unsatisfied. On July 29, 2016, Presi-
dent Obama signed a bill amending the Agricultural Marketing Act of 
1946, requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a national disclo-
sure standard for bioengineered foods.43 This was the result of a bitter fight 
in which environmentalists and consumer groups opposed large food com-
panies that were generally supported by Republicans. Congress finally 
passed the bill with strong bipartisan support in both the Senate and the 
House.44 The state of Vermont was instrumental in the passing of the bill 
as the enactment of Vermont’s own stricter labeling law forced GMO-
friendly legislators to reach a compromise on a federal bill.45 The Vermont 
law would have required clear labeling of the presence of GMOs on la-
bels.46 The requirement would have applied regardless of whether these 
products were manufactured in Vermont or in other states,47 forcing big 
food companies to either create two types of labels for their products — 
one for products sold in Vermont and one for products sold elsewhere — 
or simply disclose GMOs on all their products. Fearing the stigmatizing 
effect from disclosing GMOs in foods,48 companies were willing to reach 
a legislative compromise. President Obama signed the bill into law in July 
2016, requiring disclosure of GMOs, while giving these companies free-
dom to make it hard for consumers to find this information. 
Supporters of the new bill see the potential for a positive impact be-
cause the provision could open the door for more transparency regarding 
what goes into our food.49 Given that up to 90 percent of the corn, soy-
beans, and cotton produced in the U.S. comes from genetically modified 
seeds, the law could reach a substantial amount of products, and help ed-
ucate the public about the food it consumes.50 The satisfaction of a rare 
successful bipartisan compromise was short-lived, and the law has already 
                                                 
43 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.) (2016). 
44 See Andrea Hayley, Organic Industry at Odds Over National GMO Labeling Bill, EPOCH 
TIMES (July 18, 2016) https://perma.cc/V36U-SHQ2. 
45 See Dan D’Ambrosio, Obama Signs National GMO labeling law; VT Law Now Moot, Bur-
lington Free Press (Aug. 1, 2016) https://perma.cc/BV22-3CV9. 
46 The Vermont law required that a “packaged raw agricultural commodity” be labeled “with the 
clear and conspicuous words ‘produced with genetic engineering.’” 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 3043(b)(1) 
(2014). The law also prohibited manufacturers from labeling, advertising or indicating that food pro-
duced through genetic engineering is “’natural,’ ‘naturally made,’ or any words of similar import that 
would have a tendency to mislead a consumer.” 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 3043(c) (2014).  
47 9 VT. STAT. ANN. §3043(a)(1) (2014). 
48 Chris Moran, President Signs Law That Overturns Vermont GMO Labeling Rules, Replaces 
Them with Barcodes, CONSUMERIST (July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/JZ7G-T84J. 
49 Mark Bittman, G.M.O. Labeling Law Could Stir a Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2016, at 
A19.. 
50 Id. 
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faced strong criticism from consumer groups.51 While the law states that 
companies will have to disclose the presence of GMO ingredients, it leaves 
great discretion to companies over how to make this disclosure. The com-
pany can disclose the presence of GMOs in its product through text labels, 
symbols, or digital links such as QR codes.52 This provision is particularly 
controversial, as big food companies will likely elect to adopt QR codes, 
effectively depriving low-income populations and non-tech-savvy individ-
uals from accessing the information.53  
The bill is also under attack from GMO-friendly industries, arguing 
that “[t]he existence of a label disclosing GMO content, in itself, suggests 
that this is a product characteristic that consumers should care about. Con-
sequently, such labels are likely to ‘stigmatize’ GMO-containing prod-
ucts.”54 Because science is unsure whether the use of GMO ingredients 
poses any direct health risk to consumers, GMO-friendly lobbyists argue 
that mandatory labeling could actually “mislead and falsely alarm con-
sumers.”55 Just as with the SEC Climate risks disclosure and the Conflict 
Minerals rule, opponents of GMO labeling argue that the law is unconsti-
tutional on the basis that it mandates companies to make disclosures in 
violation of their First Amendment rights.  
III. SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The idea itself that the First Amendment could protect a company’s 
right to “conceal” information might seem counterintuitive to consumers 
and investors that are not experts in the field. For example, why would a 
company’s right to remain silent about the risk that climate change poses 
to its business trump investors’ right to get access to critical information? 
The Supreme Court has attempted to address this complex commercial 
speech issue through its jurisprudence over the last four decades, some-
times reaching inconsistent results. This section contains two subsections; 
the first summarizes this jurisprudence with regard to commercial speech, 
and the second with regard to compelled speech. Both sections are relevant 
                                                 
51 Dan Charles, Congress Just Passed a GMO Labeling Bill. Nobody’s Super Happy About It, 
NPR (July 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/Z2UP-QSL7. 
52 Richard Fama, The New GMO Labeling Law: A matter of Perspective, FOOD SAFETY NEWS 
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/R76V-ENCW.  
53 This disclosure scheme raises discrimination issues, as one-third of adults in the United States 
do not have a smartphone necessary to scan a QR code. Bittman, supra note 49; President Obama 
Signs GMO ‘Non-labeling’ Bill, Leaves Millions of Americans in the Dark, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY 
(July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/4G5Z-UR2V. 
54 See Adler, supra note 16, at 460–61. 
55 Statement by the AAS Board of Directors on Labeling of Genetically Modified Food, Am. 
Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. (Oct. 20, 2012) https://perma.cc/W4W7-D85H [hereinafter AAAS 
STATEMENT].  
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to the sustainability disclosure requirements, as they are necessary to un-
derstand the tension between mandated disclosures and freedom of speech. 
Although disclosure requirements analyzed in this article seem to better fit 
the “compelled speech” area, the Central Hudson test56 remains important 
as, due to the confusion engendered by the Supreme Court in compelled 
speech cases, Central Hudson ends up governing many of these issues. 
A. The Recognition of Commercial Speech as Protected Speech 
For a long time, the government could freely regulate purely com-
mercial advertisement,57 and the Supreme Court did not start scrutinizing 
commercial speech restrictions until Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.58 In this case,  a Virginia law pro-
vided that a pharmacist was guilty of unprofessional conduct by publish-
ing, advertising or promoting, “directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms, 
for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.”59 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Blackmun asked whether speech that does “no more 
than propose a commercial transaction” is so removed from any “exposi-
tion of ideas” and from “truth, science, morality, and arts in general,” that 
it lacks all protection.60 The Court concluded that such speech did not lack 
all protection, recognizing that individual consumers and society in gen-
eral have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.61 In 
a paragraph that seems to strongly support the type of disclosures analyzed 
in this article, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, 
is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing 
and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long 
as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the alloca-
tion of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous 
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those 
                                                 
56 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
57 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding although states and municipalities 
cannot unduly burden free expression in public streets, the Constitution did not prevent the government 
from regulating purely commercial advertising). The first attempt at protecting commercial speech 
came in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted 
that the First Amendment should prevent states from prohibiting advertisements of products or con-
duct that is clearly legal at the place advertised. Id. at 824–25. 
58 Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
59 Id. at 750. 
60 Id, at 762 (citing Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, at 385 
(1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 484 (1957)).  
61 425 U.S. at 763–64. 
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decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this 
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.62  
Although the Court also recognized that the state had a strong interest 
in making sure that pharmacists are held to high professional standards, 
the Court held that the close ethical regulations to which pharmacists in 
Virginia are subject to were sufficient to guarantee that interest.63 This de-
cision established that commercial speech enjoyed constitutional protec-
tion. But, the Court failed to articulate a clear test to scrutinize govern-
mental regulations affecting this kind of speech.  
Four years later, the Court established a test to determine whether 
commercial speech regulations were permissible in Central Hudson Gas 
v. Public Service Commission.64 In this case, the Court considered whether 
a regulation completely banning promotional advertising by an electrical 
utility violated the First Amendment.65 Justice Powell, writing for the ma-
jority, established a four-part test to analyze the constitutionality of gov-
ernmental regulations on commercial speech. First, the government may 
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to in-
form it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity.66 Accordingly, to 
rely on First Amendment protection, the activity in question must be legal. 
If the government decides to restrict commercial speech regarding illegal 
activities, the First Amendment would not apply. Second, assuming the 
government is regulating an otherwise legal activity, the government must 
assert a substantial interest.67 Third, the interest must be directly achieved 
by the restrictions on commercial speech.68 Fourth, the regulatory tech-
nique must be no more than is necessary to further that interest.69  
In Central Hudson, since the regulated activity, the distribution of 
electricity, was legal,70 the Court turned to the second question: analyzing 
the state interest in energy conservation.71 The Court concluded that “[i]n 
view of our country’s dependence on energy resources beyond our control, 
no one can doubt the importance of energy conservation.”72 The State’s 
                                                 
62 Id. at 765. 
63 Id. at 768. 
64 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
65 Id. at 558. 
66 Id. at 563–64. 
67 Id. at 564. 
68 Id. (“First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may 
not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. Second, 
if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial 
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive”). 
69 Id. (“The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal”).  
70 Id. at 567-68. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 568. 
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interest in regulating electricity advertisement was, thus, substantial. On 
the third prong, the Court concluded that, although the link between fair 
and efficient rates and electricity advertising was tenuous at best, there 
was an immediate connection between advertising and demand for elec-
tricity, meaning that the regulation passed the third inquiry.73 However, 
the regulation failed on the last prong because the law banned all promo-
tional advertising, regardless of the impact on overall energy use, thereby 
exceeding the regulatory capacity necessary to further the interest of en-
ergy conservation.74 This substantial interest could not justify suppressing 
information about devices and services that would cause no net increase 
in energy or even reduce energy consumption, so the Court held the regu-
lation unconstitutional.75  
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions merely qualified the four-part 
test. In Board of Trustees v. Fox,76 the Court clarified that the “no more 
extensive than necessary” requirement did not mean that the state had to 
use the least restrictive alternative.77 It must be a fit “that is not necessarily 
perfect, but reasonable.”78  
B. Compelled Speech Jurisprudence 
Certain types of compelled commercial speech fall under a rational 
basis standard of review, which is a lower level of scrutiny than the Cen-
tral Hudson Test. Under this approach, the government need only demon-
strate a legitimate interest and a rational connection between that interest 
and the means used to achieve it.79 Only a few cases have applied this 
standard in the context of compelled commercial speech, including the re-
cent D.C. Circuit decision regarding country-of-origin labeling on meat 
products.80   
1. Applying rational basis to compelled commercial speech  
The rational basis test in the context of compelled commercial speech 
comes from the Supreme Court case Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,81 where a state law required attorneys 
to disclose in advertisements that clients may still be liable for costs if their 
                                                 
73 Id. at 569. 
74 Id. at 570. 
75 Id. at 569–71. 
76 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).  
77 Id. at 480. 
78 Id. at 480 (citing In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)). 
79 Legal Information Institute, Rational Basis Test, https://perma.cc/CUZ3-Q6TB. 
80 See AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
81 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
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cases were unsuccessful. The Court explained that a state may require ad-
vertisers to disclose specific information if such requirement is “reasona-
bly related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”82  
Under the Zauderer test, courts should be more favorable to govern-
ment’s intrusions on commercial speech when such intrusions are aimed 
at compelling speech rather than restricting speech. Factual disclosures 
can even serve First Amendment value by promoting the exchange of 
ideas. In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes insisted on the concept 
of the First Amendment protecting a “marketplace of ideas.”83 Laws man-
dating factual disclosures inject more information into the marketplace of 
ideas and further First Amendment goals.84  
However, the Supreme Court’s language in the case created four po-
tential limits to the application of Zauderer, which opponents of compelled 
commercial speech were quick to seize on. First, because of the specific 
context of the case — compelling lawyers to disclose costs of representa-
tion — later decisions interpreted Zauderer as limiting the rational basis 
scrutiny to regulations aimed at preventing consumer deception.85 Second, 
because the regulation at stake in Zauderer affected advertising or product 
labeling at the point of sale, scholars and some lower courts have assumed 
that this was another limit to the application of rational basis in compelled 
commercial speech cases.86 Third, Justice White, writing for the majority, 
noted that the regulation only compelled the advertisement of “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his ser-
vices will be available.”87 Fourth, the Court acknowledged that “unjusti-
fied or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First 
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”88 By using abstract 
concepts, such as “unduly burdensome,” or “uncontroversial,” that it failed 
to define, the Supreme Court created considerable confusion around the 
standard to apply to compelled commercial speech cases.89  
                                                 
82 The Supreme Court applied the same test in Milavetz Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 
559 U.S. 229 (2010), and upheld a federal law requiring law firms practicing in the debt relief area to 
identify themselves as debt relief agencies. 
83 Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (J. Holmes, dissenting). 
84 Jennifer M. Keighley, Can you Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the 
First Amendment, 15 J. OF CONST. L. 539, 551 (2012). 
85 Milavetz, 559 U.S. 229. 
86 See Adler, supra note 16. 
87 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. at 651. 
88 Id.  
89 See NAM II, 800 F.3d at 528–29 (“It is also the case that propositions once regarded as factual 
and uncontroversial may turn out to be something quite different. What time frame should a court use 
in assessing this? At the time of enactment of the disclosure statute? At the time of an agency’s rule-
making implementing the disclosure statute? Or at some later time when the compelled disclosures 
are no longer considered ‘purely factual’ or when the disclosures have become ‘controversial’?”).  
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2. Compelled commercial speech jurisprudence after Zauderer 
The Supreme Court only considered the issue of compelled commer-
cial speech one other time, in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States.90 Although the Court could have refined the test to apply to com-
pelled commercial speech, the facts of the case were so similar to Zauderer 
that the Court did not bother addressing the issue in its opinion.91 Rather, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that required debt 
relief agencies to disclose the nature of their services. The Court simply 
applied the Zauderer rational basis standard to similar facts.92  
Two questions left open in the Zauderer case have engendered most 
of the confusion with regard to the compelled commercial speech test. The 
first question is whether the rational basis test articulated in Zauderer only 
applies to mandated disclosures aiming at preventing consumer deception. 
The second question left open by the Court is whether the rational basis 
test only applies to disclosures of “purely factual and uncontroversial” in-
formation, and what this standard means. The D.C. Circuit’s back-and-
forth with regard to the test illustrates this confusion.  
When reviewing the Conflict Minerals rule in 2014, a D.C. Circuit 
panel first took the stance that the reduced level of scrutiny used in Zau-
derer only applies where the disclosure prevents consumer deception.93 
Shortly after this decision, however, another D.C. Circuit panel considered 
whether a congressional mandate to place country-of-origin labeling on 
meat products violated the First Amendment.94 In AMI, the panel took a 
strikingly different position, observing that “First Amendment interests 
implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those 
at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”95 The Court concluded that 
“Zauderer’s characterization of the speaker’s interest in opposing forced 
disclosure of such information as ‘minimal’ seems inherently applicable 
beyond the problem of deception,”96 thus expressly overruling NAM I.97  
On rehearing, the three-judge panel that decided NAM I still con-
cluded that the Conflict Minerals rule violated the First Amendment. Not 
being able to rely on the “limited to prevent consumer deception” reason-
ing, the panel used other language of Zauderer to reach its conclusion, 
holding that the lower level of scrutiny only comes into play when the 
                                                 
90 Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 229.  
91 Id. at 249-50.  
92 Id. (“The challenged provisions of §528 share the essential features of the rule at issue in 
Zauderer.”). 
93 See NAM I, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
94 See AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
95 Id. at 22.  
96 Id. 
97 NAM I, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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government regulation impacts advertising or product labeling.98 Since the 
Conflict Minerals rule compelled speech on a company’s website or an-
nual report, the court concluded that the case was outside the scope of 
Zauderer and applied Central Hudson.99 The decision in NAM II100 also 
illustrates the confusion around the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
aspect of the Zauderer decision. Trying to make sense of this possible lim-
itation, the court explained that,  
[i]t is also the case that propositions once regarded as factual and un-
controversial may turn out to be something quite different. What time 
frame should a court use in assessing this? At the time of enactment 
of the disclosure statute? At the time of an agency’s rulemaking im-
plementing the disclosure statute? Or at some later time when the 
compelled disclosures are no longer considered ‘purely factual’ or 
when the disclosures have become ‘controversial’?101 
The paragraph highlights one of the main issues with the “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial” provision: the Supreme Court provided no guid-
ance as to the timing applicable to the analysis and failed to define the 
meaning of “uncontroversial.”  
The Tobacco Control Act102 of 2009 provides another illustration of 
the confusion in Zauderer. Under this act, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) published a June 2011 final ruling requiring colored graphic 
warnings on the front and back of each cigarette package sold in the U.S. 
and on advertisements.103 Tobacco companies challenged that rule in the 
D.C. Circuit, and the court struck down the rule under the Central Hudson 
test.104 The court specifically refused to apply Zauderer because the gov-
ernment failed to affirmatively demonstrate that advertisements regulated 
by the law threatened to deceive customers.105 Acknowledging that the 
governmental goal of reducing smoking may be a substantial interest, the 
                                                 
98 NAM II, 800 F.3d 518, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
99 Id. at 523–24. 
100 Id. at 523. 
101 Id. at 528-29. 
102 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control and Retirement Reform, Pub. L. No. 111-
131, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) [hereinafter Tobacco Control Act]. 
103 Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. 28973 (Aug. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, and 1143). 
104 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Under Central 
Hudson, the government must show that its asserted interest is ‘substantial.’ If so, the Court must 
determine ‘whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether 
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest’”). 
105 Id. at 1214–15 (“in the absence of any congressional findings on the misleading nature of the 
cigarette packaging itself, there is no justification under Zauderer for the graphic warning labels”). 
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court nevertheless found that the rule violated the First Amendment be-
cause the FDA failed to show that the graphic warning rule would directly 
advance this interest.106  
In the Sixth Circuit, the Tobacco rule had a different fate. In Discount 
Tobacco, the court found that the rule addressed the public’s understand-
ing of the health risks of smoking, thus preventing tobacco companies 
from being deceptive.107 Although the court framed the inquiry under a 
“preventing consumer deception” rationale to apply the lower level of 
scrutiny from Zauderer,108 the underlying reasoning may have been that 
Zauderer could be applicable in other situations like when the government 
is trying to reduce the public’s exposure to health risks.109 This would be a 
reasonable assumption as the rule was directly promoting public health by 
warning consumers of the risks associated with smoking.  
IV. EMPOWERING CONSUMERS AND INVESTORS BY DISCLOSING “BAD 
PRACTICES” 
The move toward a sustainable economy requires more incentives for 
companies to move in the same direction. Governmental incentives are 
one way to encourage companies,110 but the main driving force remains 
consumers’ and investors’ demand for more sustainable or “cleaner” prod-
ucts.111 Some information is already available to consumers and investors 
at the point of sale using labeling such as “USDA organic” or “fair 
trade.”112 This type of labeling informs consumers and investors about 
“good practices” employed by product manufacturers. Although such dis-
closures do have a positive impact on part of the consumer population,113 
disclosing “bad practices” is a better way to empower consumers and in-
vestors in the everyday choices they make on the market.  
                                                 
106 Id. at 1222.  
107 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 551 (6th Cir. 2012).  
108 Id. at 562. 
109 See Terry Baynes, Court: Tobacco Health Labels Constitutional, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2012) 
https://perma.cc/CRK5-H42W.  
110 See Environmental Protection Agency, Economic Incentives, https://perma.cc/KD75-FYKY; 
Michael Cole, Using Governmental Incentives to Finance Solar Renewable Energy Projects: Alterna-
tive Investments for High-Net-Worth Individuals, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 67 (2012). 
111 As early as 1776, the economist Adam Smith argued that consumers would determine by their 
choices what products, and what quality of products would be produced. See generally ADAM SMITH, 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
112 The organic label has enjoyed quite a bit of success, registering an impressive 11 percent raise 
in sales in 2015 from the 2014 numbers, according to the Organic Trade Association. See Maggie 
McNeil, U.S. Organic Sales Post New Record of $43.3 billion in 2015, ORGANIC TRADE ASSOCIATION 
(May 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/VRW7-JLQS.  
113 See USDA, Organic Market Overview, https://perma.cc/K5V9-NG4G (last updated April 4, 
2017) (showing the consistent increase in demand for organic products). 
82 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 8:1 
A. Illustration by the Vegetarian Movement 
The vegetarian and vegan movements provide a good illustration of 
the impact of disclosing “bad practices” on consumer decision making. 
Although these movements have been around for a long time—especially 
the vegetarian movement—the percentage of the U.S. population follow-
ing a vegetarian diet has increased dramatically in the last five years, as 
more information is available to consumers about the negative impact of 
animal farming on the environment, on health, and on the economy.114 
Mandated disclosures would also change consumers and investors’ behav-
ior by promoting the availability of information.   
1. The significant economic and environmental benefits of the vege-
tarian movement  
Consumers are realizing that choices made about the food they eat 
affect their health and impacts the environment.115 Food production causes 
a quarter of all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, of which 80% come 
from livestock production.116 Consequently, something as simple as 
changing diet may be more effective than technological mitigation options 
for avoiding climate change.117  
Changing diet would also prove valuable for the economy. Analyzing 
the effect of food diet on the economy, a study determined annual savings 
in 2050 for three different scenarios.118 The study concluded that if the 
U.S. population followed dietary recommendations (less red meat, more 
plant-based products), such a change would save $150 billion in direct 
health-care savings, $28.1 billion in indirect health-care savings, and 
$18.1 billion in environmental savings.119 These numbers increase if eve-
ryone went vegetarian: $187 billion in direct health-care savings, $36.4 
billion in indirect health-care savings, and $35 billion in environmental 
                                                 
114 See Sarah Marsh, The Rise of Vegan Teenagers: ‘More People are into it Because of Insta-
gram’, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/9B6Q-FUDF (noting that the movement “is 
driven by the young,” who testify that the availability of information explaining the environmental 
impact of the meat industry, as well as animal cruelty and the health benefits of veganism, on social 
media such as Instagram and Twitter, is the main driving force behind the movement). 
115 Ryzia de Cassia Vieira Cardoso et al., STREET FOOD: CULTURE, ECONOMY, HEALTH, AND 
GOVERNANCE 137 (1st ed. 2014).  
116 Marco Springmann et al., Analysis and Valuation of the Health and Climate Change Coben-
efits of Dietary Change, 113 Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. Of Sci. 4146 (2016). 
117 Id.  
118 Lauren Cassani Davis, The Economic Case for Worldwide Vegetarianism, THE ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://perma.cc/7VX8-WDD5. 
119 Id. 
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savings, for a total of $258 billion worth of savings.120 The numbers in-
crease even more for a vegan diet.121  
2. A key component to the growth of vegetarianism: consumer access 
to information 
In 2009, only one percent of the U.S. population reported following 
a vegetarian or vegan diet. In 2014, an impressive 5% (for a total of 16 
million people) of the population reportedly followed a vegetarian diet, 
and half of those people followed a vegan diet.122 These numbers do not 
even consider the percentage of the population that decreased their meat 
consumption in the last five years, or completely stopped eating beef.123  
One might ask why these movements gained such popularity over the 
last few years. The campaign aimed at educating consumers about the im-
pact farming meat has on the environment and health appears to be the 
main factor driving this trend.124 Approximately 42% of the population 
that does not eat animal products say they made that choice after they saw 
an educational film highlighting the negative impacts of the meat indus-
try.125 The availability of information highlighting the negative effects of 
meat eating, as well the increasing number of studies analyzing the impact 
of cattle farming on the environment or health has been a fundamental 
factor in the vegetarian trend that the U.S. has been experiencing over the 
last few years.126  
The correlation between the increase in percentage of vegetarians in 
the country and the growing access to the information about “bad prac-
tices” is clear. When consumers are aware of the negative impact of meat-
                                                 
120 Id.  
121 With a vegan diet, these numbers reach 208 billion in direct health-care savings, 40 billion in 
indirect savings, and 40 billion in environmental savings. Id. 
122 See Nadine Watters, 16 Million People in the US Are Now Vegan or Vegetarian, THE RAW 
FOOD WORLD, https://perma.cc/VE3X-BA9M. 
123 The Department of Agriculture estimated that meat consumption in the U.S. was 12.2 percent 
lower in 2012 than in 2007. See Mark Bittman, We’re Eating Less Meat. Why?, N.Y TIMES: OPINION 
PAGES (Jan. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/W44Z-DWT4. 
124 Sixty-nine percent of people asked why they do not eat animal products say they chose to eat 
a vegan diet to support the ethical treatment of animals. See Watters, supra note 122.  
125 Id. 
126 In a popular documentary, “Cowspiracy,” filmmaker Kip Andersen investigated the animal 
agriculture industry, showing how this industry is the “leading cause of deforestation, water consump-
tion and pollution, is responsible for more greenhouse gases than the transportation industry, and is a 
primary driver of rainforest destruction, species extinction, habitat loss, topsoil erosion, ocean ‘dead 
zones,’ and virtually every other environmental ill.” See About the Film, COWSPIRACY: THE 
SUSTAINABILITY SECRET, https://perma.cc/4XK6-7VHB. Although this picture might seem exagger-
ated, it does reflect the negative environmental impacts behind the animal agriculture industry. See 
Food and Agric. Org., Livestock Policy Brief 03: Cattle Ranching and Deforestation 2 (2006).  
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heavy diets on their health or the environment, they feel a sense of respon-
sibility and make choices that better align with a healthy lifestyle. This 
process—empowering consumers by providing the necessary information 
to choose between products—must expand to other sectors of the econ-
omy.  
 B. Empowering Consumers and Investors 
Of little surprise, disclosing “bad practices” can have a more rapid 
and larger impact on consumers’ and investor’s choices. Picture a con-
sumer walking into a store to buy a product; she must decide between two 
versions of the same product, one of them labeled “fair trade,” the other 
having no specific information. A consumer sympathetic to the “fair trade” 
label may pick the first product and overlook the potential surplus in cost 
associated with it. However, the relative impact of a “fair trade” label will 
depend on the consumer’s or investor’s knowledge about the meaning of 
the label and the level of concern associated with it. Picture the same con-
sumer trying to choose between two similar products; one has no specific 
message on it, while the other contains a message, “this product was man-
ufactured using child labor.” Consumers would probably choose not to buy 
the latter product. Of course, this is an extreme example, as we are a long 
way from requiring such labels on products. This example simply illus-
trates a point: disclosing “bad practices” used to manufacture a product 
plays an important role in educating the population about the choices they 
make when purchasing goods or investing in a company.  
Some companies fear that disclosing bad practices may effectively 
act as a ban on practices or content. On the other hand, such sustainability-
related disclosures generally aim at promoting the health and safety of the 
public. Should we allow companies to hide practices that endanger local 
communities in the name of profit and the companies’ freedom of speech? 
To the contrary, health and environmental concerns should trump compa-
nies’ rights in this context.  
The vegetarian movement is a good example of the positive impact 
of disclosing bad practices; it is growing because more food consumers 
become aware of the negative impact of livestock on the environment, 
health, animal welfare, and the economy. The same scheme could provide 
similar results in many other industries. By providing consumers and in-
vestors with the information necessary to understand the impact of a com-
pany on the community or the environment, such consumers and investors 
must now consider this impact when choosing to buy or invest in a prod-
uct. The conflict minerals provision of the Dodd-Frank Act is a subtler 
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example of the practice aimed at empowering investors.127 The law orders 
companies that are unable to prove that minerals used in their chain of 
supply are “DRC conflict free” to disclose such information on their web-
site. Investors must decide if they will support a company that might be 
instrumental in financing acts of war.128 With the SEC climate risk disclo-
sures, companies must investigate and report on how climate change will 
impact their business. Investors looking at the climate risk disclosures of 
a company can use that information to make responsible choices.129 The 
more information consumers and investors have when making choices 
about products to purchase or companies to invest in, the more impact 
these consumers and investors can have on the economy.130 More im-
portantly, consumers can become aware of the impact of their choices.131 
Of course, some regulation is necessary. Bombarding consumers and 
investors with information can become overbearing on companies that are 
forced to disclose information. It may also overwhelm the consumers and 
investors who still need to be able to make sense of the information avail-
able.132 A simplification of the constitutional test applied to compelled 
commercial speech regulations would balance the interests of industries 
and consumers. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence about compelled commercial speech is confusing to say the least.133 
Some courts believe that compelled commercial speech aimed at prevent-
ing consumer deception should apply the rational basis scrutiny from Zau-
derer, and other regulations should apply the classic Central Hudson test. 
The Supreme Court should resolve these problems by applying a uniform 
rational basis test to compelled commercial speech.   
                                                 
127 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
128 It might be too early to assess the true impact of the rule on investors’ behavior. However, 
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V. TOWARD A BRIGHTER FUTURE: COMMERCIAL SPEECH SHOULD NOT 
BE A HINDRANCE TO SUSTAINABILITY. 
Much of the argument coming from lobbyists opposing disclosure 
requirements relies on the idea that the consumers’ right to know is not a 
sufficient interest justifying an attack on freedom of speech.134 However, 
this argument does not really depict the conflict at stake. Freedom of 
speech does not enjoy as much protection in the context of commercial 
speech as in the context of political speech.135 Justice Blackmun’s vision 
in Virginia Board of Pharmacy136 should resonate in this context. In his 
opinion, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that in a predominantly free en-
terprise economy like the U.S., the allocation of resources in large measure 
is made through numerous private economic decisions.137 As such, “it is a 
matter of public interest that those decisions be intelligent and well in-
formed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispen-
sable.”138 Adapting his view to the pursuit of a more sustainable economy, 
one could argue that the future of our environment depends largely on de-
cisions made privately by industries that dominate their markets. To make 
decision-makers accountable and to empower consumers and investors, it 
is essential to disclose the impact of manufacturing goods or producing 
types of food, so that those decisions be intelligent and well informed. In 
this section, I first reject the industries’ legal argument that the govern-
ment’s interest at stake is simply a consumer’s right to know, which is 
insufficient to justify compelled disclosures. Second, I advocate for a sim-
pler, more permissible constitutional test to scrutinize government regula-
tions aimed at compelling commercial disclosures. Finally, I discuss the 
impact that the new administration could have on governmental regula-
tions aimed at compelling sustainability-related disclosures such as the 
ones discussed in this article.  
A. Rejecting the Industries’ Legal Argument 
When analyzing mandated disclosures, opponents of such measures 
typically rely on the tension between consumers’ “right to know” and com-
panies’ freedom of speech.139 Jonathan Adler, defending the view that 
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mandated disclosures should always be required to meet the Central Hud-
son test, presents four reasons why “the assertion of a consumer right to 
know, unconnected to a more substantial governmental interest, cannot be 
sufficient to compel commercial speech.”140 He starts by noting that a right 
to know is a rationale potentially without discernible limits, such that there 
would be “no end to the disclosures that can be mandated.”141 Adler then 
argues that calls for disclosure of information on the basis of the right to 
know come from subjective, normative claims, and not from a neutral 
viewpoint.142 Such disclosures, he continues, give voice to politically de-
termined issues that may stigmatize some sellers.143 Finally, he points out 
that the right to know facilitates government intrusion into what are, in 
fact, political questions that infringe on the core values that the First 
Amendment protects.144 Although some of the concerns that Adler raises 
are valid, he relies on flawed reasoning and fails to truly take into account 
the full purpose served by sustainability-related disclosures. Specifically, 
Adler’s characterizations of the government interest at stake, and of the 
“political” character of disclosures, seem simplistic.  
First, sustainability-related, mandated disclosures do not only serve 
the consumers’ “right to know,” but more importantly serve the purpose of 
protecting future generations from the impact of climate change by edu-
cating consumers, investors, and industries. As such, most sustainability-
related mandated disclosures should meet the first part of the Central Hud-
son test as a “substantial governmental interest.” By limiting the role of 
disclosure to simply informing consumers, Adler devalues the role and 
purpose served by such disclosures. Adler is correct that the right to know 
could potentially be unlimited because consumers are “interested in a near-
infinite range of product and process characteristics.”145 His concern that 
the government should not be able to justify serious intrusion on freedom 
of speech based solely on this interest is also valid. However, the reality is 
that the government interest at stake is often more important than an indi-
vidual’s “right to know.”  
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Adler’s second and fourth arguments advance the same theme. He 
argues that information consumers seek often depends on what is im-
portant to them, the right to know is highly subjective and sometimes 
brings into the mix political questions that are at the core of the First 
Amendment.146 In the context of sustainability-related mandated disclo-
sures, this argument is flawed. Adler argues that disclosures such as the 
ones covered in this article lack neutrality.147 But such an argument relies 
on the idea that compelled disclosures are, for all practical purposes, re-
quirements that commercial actors communicate value-laden messages 
about inherently political questions, such as how products should be made, 
animals should be treated and so on.148 However, the type of disclosures 
at issue are not inherently political. SEC climate risk disclosures or the 
conflict minerals rule come from a broader concern for climate change and 
sustainability. Climate change is not political, it is a science.149  It is a fac-
tual, scientifically proven phenomenon that does not present the subjective 
and political characteristics that Adler contends.150  
Finally, Adler argues that compelled disclosures can become a re-
quirement that a producer or seller potentially stigmatize their own prod-
uct, saying to consumers “think about it before you buy this product be-
cause of the following fact or characteristic about which you were previ-
ously unaware.”151 But this is precisely the point of compelled disclosures, 
to inform consumers and investors about the negative impact of a product 
so they are able to make meaningful decisions. Rather than stigmatizing 
consumers or producers, compelled disclosures are aimed at encouraging 
the transition toward more sustainable practices to protect future genera-
tions. Take the example of a “carbon cost” disclosure that would require 
producers and sellers to disclose on the label of their products the amount 
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of emissions one product is responsible for. Such a measure would not 
create a stigma, but rather would educate the consumer about the impact 
of one product compared to another. While Adler sees compelled disclo-
sures as a stigmatizing phenomenon, thus privileging the status quo, com-
pelled disclosures can be viewed from another angle, as a tool to empower 
producers, sellers, consumers, and investors.  
Of course, regulators could simply ban GMOs or conflict minerals 
from the chain of supply, or better regulate what could be harmful to the 
population of the environment but there are at least two issues with this 
approach. First, political opposition would likely prevent any ban from 
going through the legislative process.152 Second, relying on regulators to 
empower consumers and investors and give them the tools to influence the 
market might be ill-advised. An important perk of mandated disclosures is 
to give consumers the information they need to make a choice. Relying on 
regulators would not empower consumers and investors to the same ex-
tent.  
Opponents of disclosure requirements argue that the intermediate 
scrutiny of Central Hudson is “unlikely to prevent agencies and regulators 
from safeguarding public health or market efficiency.”153 This is true to an 
extent. Warning consumers of the direct health effects of a product will 
undoubtedly clear the “substantial interest” standard of Central Hudson. 
However, under current jurisprudence, it would fail to capture sustainabil-
ity-related compelled disclosures that, rather than warning consumers 
about direct health effect, are indirectly aimed at protecting the planet and 
future generations.154  
B. Rehabilitating Disclosure Requirements with the Constitution 
The current Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding compelled com-
mercial speech is largely unsatisfying and needs clarification. As men-
tioned above, there is currently great confusion as to whether the Zauderer 
rational basis standard is limited to disclosures aimed at preventing con-
sumer deception. Because of this confusion, courts have applied the Cen-
tral Hudson test to some cases involving compelled commercial speech 
that may not have to do with preventing consumer deception.  
The Supreme Court should resolve the confusion resulting from the 
Zauderer case in favor of a rational basis test in the compelled commercial 
speech context. Before diving into the issues with the presumed limitations 
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of the Zauderer reasoning, one must understand why the sustainability-
related disclosure requirements discussed in this article would not clear 
the Central Hudson test. Most disclosure requirements constitute a sub-
stantial governmental interest, meeting the first hurdle of the Central Hud-
son test. The issue emerges on the degree of relation between the means 
used and the interest protected. Under Central Hudson, the interest must 
be directly achieved by the regulation affecting free speech.  
Although the protection of future generations is arguably a substan-
tial governmental interest, the idea that such interest would be directly 
achieved by compelled disclosures of climate risks or conflict minerals is 
a far stretch. It would be more accurate to describe this relationship as 
indirect; the disclosures empower consumers and investors to make 
choices that, in turn, influence companies to adopt more sustainable prac-
tices that promote the interest of future generations. As such, these disclo-
sure requirements may not pass the Central Hudson test, which requires 
using means substantially related to an important governmental interest. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should revisit the Zauderer decision in 
order to eliminate the presumed limitations on the scope of the case. 
1. The limits of the Zauderer decision 
The idea that Zauderer only applies to regulations aimed at prevent-
ing consumer deception simply does not make sense. Preventing consumer 
deception would most likely clear the higher “substantial interest” bar of 
the Central Hudson test. Accordingly, the rational basis test set out in Zau-
derer would be completely unnecessary if it was limited to such instances. 
Maybe the higher level of scrutiny is imposed to require a more direct re-
lationship between the regulation and the governmental interest, but no-
where did the Court indicate such a purpose. The type of regulation the 
Supreme Court considered in both cases having to do with compelled com-
mercial speech happened to be in the context of a regulation preventing 
consumer deception. But this limit appeared to be more coincidental than 
voluntary. There is no language in Zauderer expressly limiting the scope 
of the analysis to this type of regulation.155  
 Additionally, “preventing consumer deception” is a difficult con-
cept to define. For example, the D.C. Circuit upheld the country-of-origin 
labeling requirement on meat products under the Zauderer test when the 
governmental interest was protecting consumers’ right to buy U.S.-made 
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meat.156 However, one could argue that the provision is indirectly aimed 
at preventing consumer deception. Providing information about the coun-
try-of-origin allows consumers to specifically pick locally-raised meat. In 
the absence of the country-of-origin label, a consumer might buy meat as-
suming that it was local, only to later find out the real origin. Most, if not 
all, of the types of disclosures discussed in this article are related in one 
way or another to preventing consumer deception by giving them access 
to information. This information allows consumers to knowingly choose 
the product that corresponds best to their needs, a choice they would oth-
erwise not be able to make. As such, limiting Zauderer to instances of 
consumer deception does not make any sense.  
The Court in Zauderer also did not expressly limit the application of 
the lower scrutiny standard to “purely factual and uncontroversial” infor-
mation.157 The problem with the “uncontroversial” provision of Zauderer 
is that it potentially has the effect of opening a Pandora’s box. With im-
pressive financial means and political ties, it is easy for big industries to 
“create” controversies around any type of information they would be re-
quired to disclose in the future.158 GMO labeling is a perfect example. On 
its face, whether GMOs are present in a product is purely factual and un-
controversial. Either the product contains GMOs or it does not. However, 
the opposition between GMO-friendly industries and consumer groups has 
made the topic highly political,159 and thus “controversial.” The ability to 
make a topic “controversial” is potentially unlimited. Therefore, the Su-
preme Court should make it clear that the lower level of scrutiny set out in 
Zauderer is not so limited to “purely factual and uncontroversial” infor-
mation.160 
Third, the notion coming from NAM II that Zauderer application only 
applies to disclosure requirements imposed at the point of sale or in adver-
tisements is similarly ill-advised. Nowhere in Zauderer is “point of sale” 
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mentioned,161 and there are at least two issues with this limitation. First, 
investors and consumers today find a lot of information about products on 
companies’ websites. NAM II argued that the conflict minerals rule was 
outside the scope of Zauderer because the information needed to appear 
on companies’ websites rather than at the point of sale or on advertise-
ments.162 However, for many companies, their websites constitute their 
point of sale; this is where investors get access to at least some of the in-
formation that will influence the choice to invest in a given company. Ad-
ditionally, more and more sales happen online.163  As consumers or inves-
tors spend time online, they are targeted by ads from different companies 
leading them straight to these companies’ website where they can then 
purchase products.164 The growth of e-commerce manifests itself through 
giants like Amazon and Ebay, but is now also growing for grocery sales.165 
This current trend has made the distinction between point of sale and web-
sites largely irrelevant.  
2. A resolution to the confusion in favor of compelled disclosures 
The Supreme Court should revisit Zauderer to clarify that rational 
basis applies when analyzing whether compelled commercial speech vio-
lates the First Amendment. Such a test would reconcile disclosure require-
ments like the GMO labeling law, the SEC climate risk guidance, and the 
conflict minerals rule with the Constitution. To avoid potential abuses re-
sulting from governmental intrusion on free speech, the Court could also 
retain one aspect of the Zauderer decision, “that unjustified or unduly bur-
densome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by 
chilling protected commercial speech.”166 The Supreme Court, to create an 
additional safeguard for companies’ freedom of speech, could define what 
“unduly burdensome” means, offering companies the opportunity to rebut 
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the government’s rational basis argument by showing how a disclosure 
requirement unduly burdens them.  
Consider a governmental regulation mandating the disclosure of the 
minimum wage applied by companies to their entry-level workers. To pass 
the rational basis test, the government would first argue that improving the 
quality of life of U.S. citizens and promoting a sustainable job market are 
legitimate state interests. By forcing companies to disclose the minimum 
wage applied, the regulation gives investors and consumers a chance to 
make informed decisions when purchasing a product. Because these con-
sumers now better understand why two similar products may have differ-
ent prices, they may choose to spend more money to validate the good 
practices that the government is seeking to promote. Such a regulation 
should pass the rational basis test because it advances a legitimate govern-
mental interest and the regulation is rationally related to that interest.  
The issue with such a regulation is that certain companies and indus-
tries will be hit harder than others, not because they chose to pay their 
employees lower wages, but rather because some industries thrive on mar-
gins between cost of production and sale price that are so slim that raising 
wages would destroy them. The “unduly burdensome” defense would al-
low an industry to fight the regulation and force the government to take 
into account special circumstances in the text of the law to avoid unfair or 
“unduly burdensome” results. Then, the rational basis test, although easier 
to clear, would still protect companies from overbroad government regu-
lations. 
The rational basis would offer more judicial certainty with regard to 
compelled commercial speech and allow the government to empower con-
sumers and investors to choose a more sustainable future. The test also 
aims at striking the right balance: protecting companies’ constitutional in-
terests while promoting the circulation of information on the market to 
empower consumers and investors to choose a sustainable future. As 
shown above, the main issue with the Central Hudson test is that it places 
a high bar by requiring a close relation between the government’s interests 
and the way the government promotes it. The rational basis standard pro-
vides more freedom to promote a more sustainable economy with the use 
of mandated disclosures. The “unduly burdensome” defense should shield 
companies from excessive government intrusion by giving courts the dis-
cretion to strike down a regulation excessively intruding on freedom of 
speech.  
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C. New Uncertainty: President Trump’s Administration 
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in-
creased the uncertainty surrounding governmental regulations as they ap-
ply to compelled disclosures. President Trump has been very clear that he 
would target governmental regulations, repeating that “[e]xcessive regu-
lation is killing jobs, driving companies out of our country like never be-
fore.”167 Since he took office, Trump also made clear that environment-
related regulations would be among the first targets of his great regulatory 
rollback,168 a sentiment reinforced by his announcement that the U.S. 
would withdraw from the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement.169 It 
seems unlikely that President Trump’s administration will enact new reg-
ulations aimed at compelling disclosures of information promoting sus-
tainability. As to regulations already in place, their future is seriously jeop-
ardized.  
The Conflict Minerals rule was the topic of a draft executive order as 
early as February 2017, in which President Trump proposed a two-year 
suspension of a portion of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires U.S. compa-
nies to carry out due diligence to ensure that their products do not contain 
conflict minerals.170 Although the draft has not been signed into law, it 
remains likely that the rule will be affected in the future as part of a broader 
effort to undermine the Dodd-Frank Act.171  
The implementation of the GMO labeling law is also likely to slow 
down or come to a stop. Although President Obama signed the GMO bill 
into law in July 2016, the USDA still had to draft regulations governing 
the disclosure of GMOs.172 However, President Trump signed an execu-
tive order cracking down on federal regulations, requiring federal agencies 
to eliminate two regulations before one new regulation can be imple-
mented.173 Although the GMO labeling law itself should remain intact, it 
is hard to see how it could be executed under Trump’s executive order.  
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As to SEC climate risk disclosures, it is not clear where the new ad-
ministration stands. Trump’s pick for SEC chair, Jay Clayton, said that 
companies should disclose climate-related risks.174 Clayton’s stance is 
hard to reconcile with the administration’s refusal to treat climate change 
as a priority.175 Climate risk disclosures could experience a better fate than 
the Conflict Minerals rule and the GMO labeling regulations under 
Trump’s presidency for two reasons. First, companies would generally 
benefit from such disclosures. Investigating climate risk exposure would 
incentivize companies to build up their climate resilience and be better 
equipped to face the challenges that they will face due to climate change.176 
Second, companies do not need the government’s help or approval to con-
duct these studies and disclose climate risks.177  
The full effect the new administration will have on compelled disclo-
sure will not be immediately clear, but President Trump’s first executive 
orders strongly indicate that sustainability and climate resilience are not 
among his priorities. If anything, his election should create a new sense of 
responsibility for consumers, investors, and companies to take matters into 
their own hands and do what the government will not do.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
Consumers and investors are becoming increasingly interested in the 
characteristics of a product: the type of components used, the process be-
ing used, the working conditions of the people manufacturing a product, 
whether the product is local, and the carbon footprint of a product. Inves-
tors keep pushing for increased climate risk disclosures from the SEC,178 
while the GMO labeling law came in part from a strong interest from the 
population to know whether products contain GMOs. Efforts from inves-
tors and consumers will be even more important in light of the new admin-
istration’s opposition to compelled disclosures. They not only face politi-
cal hurdles, but also judicial challenges. The issue is ripe for the Supreme 
Court to consider and clarify. The Court should not lack opportunities to 
do so: the Tobacco Control Act, the GMO-labeling law, or new SEC cli-
mate risks disclosures could all provide a chance for the highest court to 
consider compelled commercial speech. When doing so, the Court should 
use caution when determining which standard to apply when analyzing the 
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constitutionality of governmental regulations compelling commercial 
speech.  
As the AMI opinion from the D.C. Circuit suggested, “First Amend-
ment interests implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially 
weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”179 Sus-
tainability-related disclosure requirements are necessary to empower con-
sumers and investors to choose a sustainable future and protect future gen-
erations. Big industries opposing the transition to a more sustainable econ-
omy should not be allowed to use the First Amendment as a shield to shy 
away from their responsibility. At the same time, there needs to be some 
level of protection to limit governmental intrusion and safeguard the inter-
est of some industries that could become overly burdened by disclosure 
requirements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should adopt a rational ba-
sis test in the context of compelled commercial speech with a safeguard 
allowing regulated entities to show how a disclosure regulation unduly 
burdens their free speech. This solution would clarify the confusion caused 
by the Zauderer decision, and would adequately promote a sustainable 
economy by empowering consumers and investors to send a strong signal 
to industries, while safeguarding companies’ First Amendment interests.  
 
                                                 
179  AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
